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NOTES
An Arm's Length Struggle:
To Include or Not to Include Stock
Options in Cost Sharing Arrangements
and Non-Integral Service Agreements
BY KENNETH BLACKBURN*
INTRODUCTION
E very year corporations issue stock options to all levels of employ-',ees. In the United States, approximately ten million workers have
a total grant value of $1 trillion in stock options.' Stock options give
employees the opportunity to buy a set number of shares of the corpora-
tion's stock at a given price for a certain period of time.2 As early as 1988,
stock options were being provided to middle and lower level managers as
well as non-management employees.3 To illustrate the impact stock options
have on employees' income, consider that during the months of May
through July of 2000, the employees of San Jose-based Cisco Systems
exercised stock options resulting in approximately $4.5 billion in taxable
gains.4 Indeed, stock options have become an important component of
compensation to all levels of American workers.
"C.P.A. Commonwealth of Kentucky. M.B.A. 2000, University of Kentucky;
J.D. expected 2003, University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank Shawn
Johnson and Todd Hauss for their insight and review. The author would also like
to give credit to his loving wife, Shea, for her patience and encouragement
throughout the entire law school experience.
'Ruth Simon, Options About Options, and a Geography of the Pitfalls, WALL
ST. J., June 4, 2001, at C I.21d.
Jill Bettner, Workplace: Firms Give Stock Options to Wider Range of Workers
in Effort to Instill Loyalty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1988, at B 1.
4 Scott Thurm & Mitchel Benson, Vanishing Windfall: Weak Stock Market Is
Beginning to Pinch Some States 'Budgets, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2001, at Al.
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A controversy has arisen regarding the inclusion of compensation,
taxed to American employees upon exercising stock options, as a cost in
cost sharing arrangements between related parties.' The Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") has expanded this position to encompass service agree-
ments for non-integral services between related parties.' With a value of
over $1 trillion in outstanding stock options,7 multinational corporations
face a large dilemma concerning whether to include stock option gains
taxed to employees in the cost sharing and non-integral service expense
pools billed to affiliates.8
Imagine the complexity and uncertainty of including stock options as
costs to be billed under cost sharing or other similar arrangements. Under
the IRS's approach of including the perceived value of the stock options
upon issuance in the cost pools, corporations issuing stock options may
potentially have to value the option using an economic-based valuation
method, such as the Black-Scholes Method.9 These valuation methods
consist of a series of variables that are predicated on risk-adjusted
probabilities and advanced statistics. 10 With probabilities in the equation,
corporations making these calculations are guaranteed an audit adjustment.
The IRS will argue that the variables and probabilities used by the
corporation are incorrect, further adding a layer of complexity and
uncertainty to the system of tax compliance and audit.
The proposed inclusion of the stock option's value as a component of
the cost pools shared under a cost sharing arrangement creates other
I.R.S. FSA 200103024 (Jan. 19, 2001) (The IRS ruled that Treas. Reg. §
1.482-7 requires the value of compensatory stock options be included in cost
sharing pools. Although a Field Service Advisory ("FSA") is only applicable to the
party involved in the FSA, it is a clear indication of the intention and views of the
IRS on the issue.).
6 Respondent's Memorandum of Facts and Law at 27, Seagate Tech., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 912 (2000) (No. 15086-98).
' Simon, supra note 1.
8 Even though the stock market is currently in a downturn, the stock option
inclusion in cost sharing arrangements will continue to be a focal point for
corporate tax professionals. As stock values decline, the exercise price of new
stock options will be decreased, equating to potentially large gains to the option
holders when the market rebounds. See generally infra note 106 and accompanying
text.
9 See infra note 12 and accompanying text (The IRS has provided options for
valuation in proposed regulations issued on July 29, 2002. The options allow for
valuation without the use of Black-Scholes.).
10 Zvi BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 669-70 (4th ed. 1999).
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complications and potential injustices. For example, what if the stock
option's perceived value is billed to an affiliate participating in a cost
sharing arrangement, and subsequently the stock of the corporation
performing the services loses half of its value? Now the exercise price of
the stock option is above the market price at which the employee holding
the option can exercise the stock on the open market. If the market price
does not again exceed the purchase price, the stock option will be worthless
and the employee will allow the option to lapse. The affiliate participating
in the cost sharing arrangement will have paid for the stock option, but the
stock option will not have resulted in income to an employee. Is it the
correct answer to have charged an affiliate for a stock option that ultimately
becomes worthless? This is one example of the several issues raised by the
IRS's position in Field Service Advisory 200102003, which includes stock
option costs in arrangements for non-integral services and cost sharing.
This Note proposes that the IRS should abandon its position of
including stock option paper gains in cost sharing arrangements and non-
integral service contracts. The IRS's position contradicts the arm's length
standard, which is required to value transactions between related parties.
To meet an arm's length standard, a transaction between related parties
must be consistent with results that unrelated parties conducting the same
transaction would have achieved under similar circumstances." The main
problem with the IRS's position that stock option gains are costs of
compensation is that unrelated parties do not consider stock options when
entering cost sharing arrangements or service agreements. Therefore,
inclusion of the perceived value of stock options on the grant date would
not be in line with the arm's length standard.
Taking the IRS's position to its logical end, an IRS agent could
argue that the transfer prices for goods should include stock option
gains. 2 This position would follow the premise that stock options granted
to manufacturing employees are costs of compensation to be included
in the product's transfer price.'3 Clearly this is illogical, but the position
"Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1994).
12 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,997 (July 29, 2002) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing an amendment to the comparable profits
method whereby taxpayers would have to adjust comparables results to reflect
stock options). Under this regulation, a taxpayer using the comparable profits
method as a transfer pricing methodology for the sale of tangible goods would have
to start including the perceived cost of stock options in their results and the
comparable's results. Id.
'" This assertion is based on the broad application of the IRS theory that stock
option gains or the stock option's value is compensation to be included in cost
sharing arrangements and service agreements. Under this logic, the IRS could apply
2002-2003]
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follows the IRS's rationale that stock option gains are costs of compensa-
tion. 4
This Note is divided into three parts. Part I provides background
information on the sources of law underlying transfer pricing and stock
options and introduces cost sharing and non-integral service agreements. 5
Part II analyzes the IRS's position regarding the inclusion of stock options
in cost sharing arrangements and service agreements, while highlighting
criticisms of the IRS's position. 6 Part 11 discusses the newly issued
proposed regulations requiring the inclusion of stock options in cost sharing
arrangements. 7
I. BACKGROUND LEGAL CONCEPTS
This Part provides an overview of two tax concepts: transfer pricing
and stock options. The first sub-part explains transfer pricing, including the
general aspects of transfer pricing, cost sharing arrangements, and non-
integral service agreements. Several examples in 'this sub-part provide the
reader with an understanding of the processes and interactions of transfer
pricing. Most of the examples will entail transfers of tangible property, but
the -same concepts apply to services and the transfer of intangibles. The
second sub-part explains stock options, including non-statutory stock
options, statutory stock options, and the accounting treatment of both types.
Part I will only provide a general explanation of each of these principles,
as the detailed technicalities are beyond the scope of this Note.
A. Transfer Pricing
1. General Concepts
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("Code") was
enacted to ensure that taxpayers "clearly reflect income attributable to
the compensatory theory to stock options granted to manufacturing employees, and
argue that the stock option gains or value must be included in the transfer price of
goods sold to related parties. See I.R.S. FSA 200102003 (Jan. 12, 2001) for a
general discussion of the IRS theory.
'4 In addition, the IRS is proposing an allocation of stock option gains to non-
deductible lobbying expenses. See generally I.R.C. § 162(e) (1998). The IRS's
position is that stock options are allocable to lobbying as labor costs, therefore
denying the deduction of the stock option gains of employees found to be
performing lobbying activities. See I.R.S. FSA 200102003 (Jan. 12, 2001). This
Note does not opine on the accuracy of this IRS position.
13 See infra notes 18-110 and accompanying text.
'6 See infra notes 111-37 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 138-56 and accompanying text.
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controlled transactions, and to prevent the avoidance of taxes with respect
to such transactions."' 8 Code Section 482 is intended to put "a controlled
taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer" by computing the
"true taxable income" of the taxpayer participating in a controlled
transaction. 9 The definition of a controlled taxpayer is a "taxpayer...
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, and
includes the taxpayer that owns or controls the other taxpayers."20
Accordingly, an uncontrolled taxpayer is a taxpayer not controlled either
directly or indirectly by another taxpayer.2 ' All corporations within a web
of control are titled "members of a controlled group. 22
In this context, the term "controlled" includes all types of control,
regardless of its form or mode.23 A corporation is presumed to control
another corporation if it has the ability to shift income or deductions
between members of the controlled group.24 To illustrate, if Corporation A
(U.S. corporation) has the ability to determine the price that Corporation B
(non-U.S. corporation) will charge Corporation A for widgets, Corporation
A is presumed to have control over Corporation B. The ability of Corpora-
tion A to determine Corporation B's revenue and the corresponding cost of
goods sold of Corporation A reflects the required control. The term
"controlled transaction" adequately describes this hypothetical buy-sell
arrangement, since the transaction is between taxpayers within the
controlled group.25
The IRS uses the arm's length standard to determine the "true taxable
income" of taxpayers within a controlled group.26 For controlled transac-
tions to meet the arm's length standard, the financial results of the
controlled transactions must be consistent with financial results that two
uncontrolled parties would have achieved if they conducted the same
transactions. 27 The arm's length standard will generally be determined by
analyzing the financial results of comparable transactions'under similar
circumstances, that is, a trangaction between unrelated parties. 28 Taxpayers
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (1994).
9 Id. See Comm'r v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 400 (1972).
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(5) (1994).
21 Id§ .22 Id. § 1.482-1'(i)(6).
23 Id. § 1.482-1 (i)(4).
24 Id.
25 See id. § 1.482-1(i)(8).26 Id. § 1.482-1(b)(1).
27 Id.
28Id.
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are required to establish documentation by the filing of that year's tax
return, which should reflect that the taxpayer's results in controlled
transactions have met the arm's length standard during the year.29 The
arm's length standard is far-reaching and applies to "transfers of property,
services, loans or advances, and rentals" among members of the controlled
group.30 Due to the complexities of transfer pricing, multi-national
corporations allocate enormous amounts of time and resources in their
efforts to comply with the arm's length standard and reporting'require-
ments. Transfer pricing complexities are heightened by the fact that most
transfer pricing issues involve more than one country, with each country
attempting to maximize its own tax revenue.31
Returning to the aforementioned buy-sell hypothetical, the arm's length
standard can be easily illustrated. Assume Corporation A determines the
price that Corporation B will charge for its widgets to be $1.00 per widget.
In addition, assume that Corporation B only sells to Corporation A during
the year. At the end of the year, Corporation B reports operating income as
a percentage of sales (hereinafter "operating income percentage") of five
percent.32 To determine if Corporation B's results meet the arm's length
29I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B)(II) (1989) (To avoid substantial penalties, the taxpayer
is required to maintain contemporaneous documentation that sets forth the method
and the reasonableness of the method of determining the Section 482 transfer
price.).
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(2)(ii) (1994).
31 In the cost sharing context, the country containing the taxpayer who is billing
the costs (CountryA) will want to maximize the amount included in the cost pool. By
maximizing the amount included in the cost pool, Country A will reduce the
taxpayer's deductions from taxable income. This is because each dollar of cost billed
out under a cost sharing arrangement is a reduction in the amount of deductions on the
tax return. For example, if the Country A corporation initially includes $1 million of
costs in the cost sharing pools and the taxing authorities of Country A increases this
amount to $2 million, the CountryA corporation will have $1 million less deductions
for that year because the deductions will have shifted to the cost sharing participant.
On the other hand, the taxing authorities of the Country B, where the cost sharing
participant resides, will want to decrease the costs paid by its participant because this
billing will result in tax deductions for the CountryB corporation. Therefore, Country
A will want to increase the cost pool to reduce the Country A corporation's tax
deductions, while Country B will want to decrease the costs eligible for the cost pool
to decrease the deductions on Country B corporation's tax return. This can become a
very contentious situation for tax-payers.
32 The operating income is calculated by taking all revenue from operations,
subtracting cost of goods sold, and subtracting operating expenses. In order to get
the operating income percentage, take the operating income figure and divide it by
the amount of revenue from operations.
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standard, the corporation must compare its five percent operating income
percentage to the operating income percentages of unrelated corporations
selling similar products under similar circumstances. An unrelated
corporation is termed a "comparable." Analysis of the comparable's results
establishes a range of operating income percentages. If Corporation B's
operating income percentage of five percent is within the established range
of comparable operating income percentages, the transactions between
Corporation A and Corporation B will meet the arm's length standard. If
Corporation B determines that its achieved results are outside the
comparables range, Corporation B will make an adjustment to move its
results to within the comparables range.33 This is an extremely simplified
explanation of the arm's length standard, but it provides a representation
of the process corporations go through when analyzing transfer pricing.34
The buy-sell arm's length standard can hypothetically be modified to
accommodate a cost sharing arrangement. To meet the arm's length
standard under a cost sharing arrangement, Corporation A (corporation
billing the costs) must include the same cost structure in the cost pool as
would an unrelated party billing another unrelated party for shared costs.
If the costs included in the cost pool are deemed to be the same costs that
two unrelated parties would bill and accept as part of a cost sharing
arrangement, the transaction will meet the arm's length standard.
The IRS has broad authority to make allocations among members of a
controlled group if the IRS determines that the true taxable income has
not been properly allocated among members of the controlled group.35
This broad authority allows the IRS to allocate income, allowances,
deductions, basis, credits, or any other item that affects taxable income.36
If the IRS determines that an allocation is warranted, the taxpayer bears the
burden of proving that the IRS's allocations are arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable.37 Whether the IRS exceeds its discretion is a question of
3 The adjustments are termed "compensating adjustments." The adjustments
will have an effect on Corporation A and Corporation B's financial results, so each
entity will book the necessary adjustments and take the adjustments into account
in calculating their respective taxable incomes. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 T(e)(2).
14 Id. § 1.482- 1T(e) (The example within this regulation reflects the analysis
and adjustments performed to achieve the results required per the ann's length
standard.).
35 See, e.g., Edwards v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 224, 230 (1976); PPG Indus. v.
Comm'r, 55 T.C. 928, 990-91 (1970).36 See Edwards, 67 T.C. at 230.
37 See, e.g., Your Host, Inc. v. Comm'r, 489 F.2d 957,960 (2d Cir. 1973); G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 252,358 (1987). See also Altama Delta Corp. v.
Comm'r, 104 T.C. 424,457 (1995); Seagate Tech. Inc. v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 149,
2002-2003]
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fact.3" The reasonableness of an IRS allocation under Section 482 is
determined based on the reasonableness of the result, not the details of
the methodology.39 Therefore, if the IRS's allocation is shown to have
been within its discretion and is reasonable, a court will sustain the alloca-
tion.
40
To illustrate the IRS's approach upon audit, we will return to the buy-
sell hypothetical. Suppose Corporation B has determined its operating
income percentage of five percent is within the arm's length range of the
comparables determined by Corporation B. In its audit, the IRS will review
Corporation B's comparables to verify that they are truly comparable to
Corporation B's business. If the IRS determines that either all or some of
the comparables are not true comparables, the IRS will establish its own set
of comparables. By establishing a new set of comparables, the IRS will also
establish a new range of operating income percentages. It will then compare
Corporation B's operating income percentage of five percent to the new
range of comparable operating income percentages. If the five percent is
above the IRS's established range, it will propose an adjustment to reduce
the income of Corporation B and a corresponding decrease for Corporation
A of cost of goods sold.4' Alternatively, if the five percent is below the
IRS's established range, the IRS will propose an adjustment to increase the
income of Corporation B and a corresponding increase of cost of goods sold
for Corporation A.42 Corporation B would then have to accept the adjust-
ment or challenge it at either the appellate stage of the audit process or in
court.
163-64 (1994).
38 American Terrazzo Strip Co. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 961, 971 (1971).
39 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990, 997 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
4o See Paccar Inc. v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 754, 787 (1985), af'd, 849 F.2d 393 (9th
Cir. 1988).
4' The adjustment to Corporation B's revenue will decrease the operating income,
resulting in a decrease in taxable income. The corresponding adjustment to
Corporation A's cost of goods sold will increase operating income, resulting in an
increase in taxable income. IfCorporationA and Corporation B pay taxes at the same
tax rate, generally the adjustment will not cause a change to the tax position of either
corporation, but if they pay taxes at different rates, the tax position can drastically
change for the two corporations. Typically, differing tax rates occur when the two
corporations reside in different countries.
42 The adjustment to Corporation B's revenue will increase the operating income,
resulting in an increase in taxable income. The corresponding adjustment to
Corporation A's cost of goods sold will decrease operating income, resulting in a
decrease in taxable income. This outcome can have dramatic outcomes on the tax bill
of each of these corporations. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(g)(2)(iii)(E) (1994).
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The same process applies to cost sharing as to non-integral service
agreements. If the IRS determines that costs should have been included in
the cost pools but were not, it will propose an adjustment to correct the
perceived error.
2. Non-Integral Service Agreements
As previously stated, the transfer pricing rules govern the charges for
services provided between members of a controlled group. The IRS may
make allocations of income and deductions among taxpayers within a
controlled group when a service, such as "marketing, managerial, adminis-
trative, technical, or any other services," is performed by a member of a
controlled group that benefits another member of the controlled group, but
is not charged at an arm's length price. 3 These allocations may be made for
services performed exclusively for another member of the controlled group
or for services undertaken for the joint benefit of all members of the
controlled group." A limitation is placed on the IRS's ability to allocate
when the anticipated benefits to other members of the controlled group are
so remote that an unrelated taxpayer would be unwilling to pay for the
services or benefits due to the remoteness of the benefit.45 As previously
stated, the goal of the arm's length standard is to assure that the results of
controlled transactions mirror the results obtained in transactions between
unrelated parties.
The charges for services that are integral to the business of the member
performing the service or of the member receiving the benefit of the service
should be based on the normal arm's length standard.46 However, if the
services are not an integral part of the business activity of either member
of the controlled group, the arm's length charge will be equal to the costs
or deductions incurred by the member performing the services.4 7
The regulations place an emphasis on the taxpayer keeping adequate
books and records to verify the costs and deductions to be reimbursed by
the member of the controlled group receiving the benefit.4" The costs or
deductions taken into account in billing the non-integral services must
include all costs directly or indirectly related to the services performed. 9
431Id. § 1.482-2(b)(1).
44Id. § 1.482-2(b)(2)(i).
45 Id.
4Id. § 1.482-2(b)(3).
47 id.
48 Id.
49Id. § 1.482-2(b)(4)(i).
2002-2003]
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A "direct cost" is defined as a cost that has been incurred specifically
for the performance of the service." Such costs include, but are not limited
to, costs of compensation and bonuses, travel expenses of employees
directly involved with performing the service, and materials and supplies
consumed during the performance of the service."
Indirect costs include costs that are not incurred specifically for the
performance of the service, but are generally related to the direct costs
incurred in performing the service.52 Examples of indirect costs include
occupancy costs, supervisory and clerical costs, general and administrative
costs, utilities, or any other overhead costs of the departments performing
the service." In addition, indirect costs include costs incurred by depart-
ments that provide support for the performance of the services. 4
The method of determining which costs directly relate or support the
performed service must be consistent, reasonable, and maintain sound
accounting principles.5 Direct costs are generally easy to determine since
the costs are incurred specifically for the services provided, but indirect
costs do not have a direct link to the services performed, resulting in a
required allocation of indirect costs to the performed services. The
allocation requirements apply to both allocating costs to the performed
services and determining how much to bill each entity when the services
are performed for the joint benefit of all members of the controlled group. 6
Several costs do not have to be taken into account when calculating the
charge to the controlled corporation for non-integral services. These costs
include: interest expense on debt incurred for the benefit of the incurring
corporation, 7 costs of issuing stock and the related investor relations
expenses," and expenses of complying with governmental regulations that
have no correlation to the performed service. 9
To illustrate the application of allocations to a non-integral service
agreement, assume the tax department of Corporation A performs tax
50 Id. § 1.482-2(b)(4)(ii).
51Id.
52 Id. § 1.482-2(b)(4)(iii).
53 Id.
54 Id. (An example of supporting costs are costs incurred by an accounting
group paying the bills and payroll of the department actually performing the
services.).
55 Id. § 1.482-2(b)(6)(i).
56 Id. § 1.482-2(b)(6)(ii).
57 Id. § 1.482-2(b)(5)(i).
58 Id. § 1.482-2(b)(5)(ii).
19Id. § 1.482-2(b)(5)(iii).
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services for Corporation B. Corporation A will incur salary expense, travel
costs, supplies cost, etc., for performance of these services. These costs are
considered direct costs, since the costs are incurred specifically for the tax
services performed by Corporation A. The costs will be allocated between
the tax services performed by Corporation A for its own tax needs and the
services performed for Corporation B's tax needs. An example of a method
used to perform this allocation would be to base the allocation on time
spent by Corporation A's tax department on Corporation A's tax needs and
Corporation B's tax needs. The costs allocated to Corporation B's tax needs
will go into a cost pool to be billed to Corporation B. Since Corporation A
is not in the business of providing tax services, the services are considered
non-integral services; therefore, Corporation A may bill Corporation B the
actual costs of the services performed, without inclusion of a profit margin.
The second component of the cost pool billed to Corporation B is
indirect costs. In order for Corporation A to perform the tax services, the
tax department of Corporation A must use computers that are maintained
by the information technology department ("IT department") of Corpora-
tion A. These costs will be charged to the tax department based on
established rates used to allocate costs for budgetary purposes.' These
costs are considered indirect costs, because the department's services are
not direct tax services, but are services that support the tax services. The
same allocation performed to allocate the direct costs of Corporation A's
tax department between the work performed for Corporation A's tax needs
and the work performed for Corporation B's tax needs will be used to split
the indirect costs between Corporation A's services for its own needs and
the services performed for Corporation B.
When all the allocations are finalized, the direct and indirect costs
associated with tax services performed on Corporation B's behalf will be
billed to Corporation B. As you can see, the calculations that determine
Corporation B's bill rely heavily upon established accounting principles
and budgeting processes.
3. Cost Sharing Arrangements
When a corporation enters into a cost sharing arrangement for research
and development ("R&D") projects, the corporation agrees to share the
0 The rates used to allocate costs of an IT department could be based on time
spent servicing each particular department receiving services. Another approach
may be to allocate costs to departments based on the number of computers used by
that particular department. With allocating costs, a method must be established to
spread costs among a group of departments based on a logical basis of allocation.
Id. § 1.482-2(b)(6)(i).
2002-2003]
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costs and risks of the R&D in connection with projects governed by the
agreement. In return, the taxpayer making the cost sharing payments will
not be required to pay royalties for exploiting the intangible property
because they own rights to the property, due to having paid a part of the
R&D costs.6 The costs to be shared will include the costs associated with
successful as well as unsuccessful projects, since the risks must also be
shared.62 The shared costs must include all of the R&D costs necessary to
develop the property, and should be contemporaneously reimbursed to the
taxpayer incurring the original cost. 63 A cost sharing arrangement allows
U.S. corporations to transfer the fruits of their R&D efforts in the United
States to foreign members of the controlled group in exchange for
reimbursement of a portion of the R&D costs, without having to charge
royalties.'
If specific rules are met, the cost sharing arrangement will be consid-
ered a qualified cost sharing arrangement by the IRS. 65 The IRS will not
61 I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458.
62 id.
63 Respondent's Memorandum of Facts and Law at 17, Seagate Tech., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 912 (2000) (No. 15086-98).
64 Id.
65 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(b) (as amended in 2001) provides:
A qualified cost sharing arrangement must-
(1) Include two or more participants;
(2) Provide a method to calculate each controlled participant's share of
intangible development costs, based on factors that can reasonably be
expected to reflect that participant's share of anticipated benefits;
(3) Provide for adjustment to the controlled participants' shares of
intangible development costs to account for changes in economic
conditions, the business operations and practices of the participants, and
the ongoing development of intangibles under the arrangement; and
(4) Be recorded in a document that is contemporaneous with the
formation (and any revision) of the cost sharing arrangement and that
includes-
(i) A list of the arrangement's participants, and any other member of
the controlled group that will benefit from the use of intangibles
developed under the cost sharing arrangement;
(ii) The information described in paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of this
section;
(iii) A description of the scope of the research and development to be
undertaken, including the intangible or class of intangibles intended
to be developed;
(iv) A description of each participant's interest in any covered
intangibles. A covered intangible is any intangible property that is
[VOL. 91
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propose allocations to a qualified cost sharing arrangement, except to make
each party's share of costs equivalent to each party's anticipated economic
benefits attributable to the R&D projects.' For a controlled taxpayer to be
a participant in a qualified cost sharing agreement, the controlled taxpayer
must anticipate deriving an economic benefit from the R&D projects." This
ensures the division of costs is commensurate with the future income
attributable to the intangible being developed, preventing the sharing of
costs by a taxpayer who does not anticipate receiving any benefit from the
project. To allow a corporation to pay the costs of a research project in
which the corporation does not expect to derive income would defeat the
purpose of the arm's length standard.
The R&D costs to be included as shared costs consists of all costs
incurred by the participant developing the property, plus all cost sharing
payments made to other participants, minus any cost sharing payments
received from other participants.6" The costs incurred by the developing
participant include operating expenses,69 minus depreciation and amortiza-
tion,7" plus the cost of using any tangible property in the development of the
property governed by the cost sharing arrangement.7
To illustrate the rules regarding a cost sharing arrangement, assume
Corporation A is a U.S. corporation and Corporation B is a German
corporation. CorporationA and Corporation B enter a qualified cost sharing
arrangement to develop a new cellular phone. This agreement states that
developed as a result of the research and development undertaken
under the cost sharing arrangement (intangible development area);
(v) The duration of the arrangement; and
(vi) The conditions under which the arrangement may be modified or
terminated and the consequences of such modification or termination,
such as the interest that each participant will receive in any covered
intangibles.
6 Id. § 1.482-7(a)(2) (as amended in 2001).67 Id. § 1.482-7(c)(1)(i).
68Id. § 1.482-7(d)(1).
691 Id. § 1.482-5(d)(3) (1994) provides:
Operating Expenses includes all expenses not included in cost of goods sold
except for interest expense, foreign income taxes (as defined in § 1.901-
2(a)), domestic income taxes, and any other expenses not related to the
operation of the relevant business activity. Operating expenses ordinarily
include expenses associated with advertising, promotion, sales, marketing,
warehousing and distribution, administration, and a reasonable allowance
for depreciation and amortization.
10Id. § 1.482-7(d)(1) (as amended in 2001).
71id.
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Corporation A and Corporation B will share the costs of the R&D facility
located in the U.S., salaries of the researchers, reasonable overhead, and the
costs associated with support groups indirectly assisting in the development
of the new cellular phone. If the IRS audits the cost sharing arrangement
and finds that supplies were used in the development project but not
included in the cost sharing pool of costs, the IRS will make an adjustment
resulting in an additional cost billed to Corporation B.
Next, assume the costs are split between Corporation A and Corpora-
tion B on a fifty/fifty basis, due to the anticipated fifty/fifty split in the sales
of the new cellular phone, but the IRS makes a determination that
Corporation A and Corporation B benefited from the fruits of the R&D
project on a twenty-five/seventy-five basis, respectively. The IRS will
propose an adjustment to remove twenty-five percent of the costs from
Corporation A's books and add that twenty-five percent to the books of
Corporation B.72 The IRS will base this adjustment on the assertion that
Corporation B sells seventy-five percent of the new cellular phones, while
Corporation A only sells twenty-five percent of the new cellular phones.
Therefore, Corporation A and Corporation B will have an audit
adjustment for costs that have been excluded from the cost pool and an
adjustment for the actual allocation of the costs among the members
participating in the cost sharing arrangement. These adjustments would
result in an increase in the cost pool, as well as a twenty-five percent
increase in the amount billed to Corporation B and a corresponding twenty-
five percent decrease in the amount on Corporations A's books.
As you can see, the area of transfer pricing is very complex and
differences will occur as to what constitutes an arm's length charge. The
calculation of prices to charge or costs to bill relies heavily on adequate
accounting records and the financial results of the affected taxpayers.
B. Stock Options
There are two types of stock options that a corporation may grant to an
employee. The first type of stock option is a "nonqualified stock option"
("NQSO"), which acquires its name from not having to meet specific tax
rules.7" The second type of stock option is an "incentive stock option"
" The adjustment will decrease the amount of the cost pool remaining on Cor-
porations A's books from fifty percent to twenty-five percent, while increasing the
costs on Corporation B's books from fifty percent to seventy-five percent. This
adjustment would reflect the IRS's perceived benefit to each corporation.
73 Simon, supra note 1.
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("ISO"), which has strict limits as to how many may be issued to employ-
ees, but carries special tax advantages.74 This section will discuss both
types of stock options and explain the accounting treatment governing
them.
1. NQSOs
An NQSO is taxable to an employee or contractor when it becomes
substantially vested to that individual.75 The employer receives a deduction
for the taxable year in which the employee is required to include the NQSO
in his or her income.76 The deduction for the employer and the income to
the employee are the fair market value at the time the NQSO becomes
substantially vested77 over the amount paid by the employee for the stock.7"
To illustrate, assume Corporation A provides an employee with one
hundred NQSOs at an exercise price often dollars, which vest sixty percent
in the third year and twenty percent in each of the next two years. The
options, therefore, will be fully vested in the fifth year after issuance. On
the date sixty percent of the NQSOs vest, the employee exercises the entire
sixty percent of his or her NQSOs when the market value of Corporation
A's stock is twenty dollars, resulting in the employee paying $600 for the
sixty shares of Corporation A's stock. The employee receives sixty shares
with a fair market value of $1200 but is only out-of-pocket $600."9
Therefore, the employee will have $600 of income, and Corporation A will
get a deduction of $600. Both the income and deduction are calculated by
taking the total fair market value of the stock received upon exercising the
NQSOs, $1200, and subtracting the price paid for the stock, $600, resulting
in the employee receiving $600 more than the amount he or she paid.
If the fair market value of the stock is below the exercise price of the
NQSOs, the employee will not elect to exercise the options because the
employee could pay less for the stock by buying it on the open market.
Accordingly, the NQSO is considered out-of-the-money and will provide
no income to the employee or deduction for the employer because the fair
market value is below the price to be paid.
74 id.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) (1978).
76 I.R.C. § 83(h) (1969).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1)(i).781d. § 1.83-1(a)(1Xii).
9 The fair market value is calculated by multiplying the sixty shares by the $20
value of each share. The calculation results in a fair market value of $1200.
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2. ISOs
In order for a stock option to qualify as an ISO, strict requirements are
placed on the stock options and on the recipient. To qualify as an ISO, the
stock options must be granted pursuant to a director-approved plan that
provides for the stock options."0 The plan must receive the approval of the
shareholders of the corporation granting the stock options within a twelve-
month period before or after the adoption of the plan by the directors."1 The
options must be granted within ten years from the date on which the
directors adopt the plan or the date of shareholder approval, whichever is
earlier.8 2 Lastly, the option by its terms must be exercised within ten years
or the stock option is forfeited. 3
In addition to these procedural requirements, strict value requirements
must also be met. First, the option price must be at least equal to the fair
market price at the date of grant.8 4 Secondly, an ISO is limited to $100,000
aggregate fair market value of stock per year; 5 any amounts exercised
above the $100,000 limit are governed by the rules pertaining to NQSOs.
6
Finally, to qualify as an ISO, the recipient of the option must own less than
ten percent of the total voting power of the outstanding stock; the
recipient may only transfer the ISO by will or by applicable state law
controlling descent and distribution.8
In addition to restrictions on the issuing corporation, limitations are
also placed upon the recipient exercising the ISO. In order for an individual
to receive the ISO's favorable tax treatment, the share of stock received
upon exercising the ISO must not be transferred "within 2 years from the
date of the granting of the option nor within 1 year after the transfer of such
share [of stock] to him."8 9 Also, the recipient must be an employee of the
corporation granting the option or an employee of a controlled group,
including the granting corporation.9° This employment must exist from the
801 I.R.C. § 422(b)(1) (1981) (providing that the plan must include the aggregate
number of shares to be issued and the employees eligible to receive options).81Id
82Id. § 422(b)(2).
83Id. § 422(b)(3).
"Id. § 422(b)(4).8 5Id. § 422(d)(1).
86 Treas. Reg. § 14a.422A-1, QA-14 (1992).
87 I.R.C. § 422(b)(6) (2002).
88 Id. § 422(b)(5) (providing that he must only exercise the option during his
lifetime).
9 d. § 422(a)(1).
9 Id. § 422(a)(2).
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grant date of the ISO and continue at least three months before the exercise
date of the option.9
If all the aforementioned requirements are met, the ISO does not result
in taxable income to the recipient upon the exercise of the qualified ISO.
92
While the ISO recipient is enjoying favorable tax treatment, the employing
corporation is barred from taking a deduction regarding the exercise of the
ISO.93 Consequently, corporations may use ISOs to provide a tax free
benefit to corporate executives, although the corporation itself does not
receive a tax deduction when all the requirements are met to qualify the
ISO.
If an employee fails to hold the stock for the required period9a or
otherwise disqualifies the ISO, the employee will forfeit the favorable tax
treatment and will realize income in the year of the disqualifying disposi-
tion.95 Additionally, the employer will take a deduction in the year of
disqualification.96 Thus, if the disposition of the stock causes a disqualifica-
tion of the ISO, the income to the recipient and the deduction to the
corporation will be calculated based on the rules used for NQSOs.97
Therefore, ISOs essentially become NQSOs upon disqualification.
To illustrate, assume Corporation A grants an ISO to its Chief
Executive Officer ("CEO") pursuant to a plan that has been properly
adopted by the directors and shareholders. The CEO sells the stock before
the one year holding period has lapsed, resulting in a disqualification of the
ISO. Further, assume that the price the CEO paid for the stock was $20, and
that the CEO sold the stock for $50. Due to the forfeiture of the favorable
tax treatment, the CEO will now have to report $30 of income, and
Corporation A will deduct $30 on its tax return.9" The income will be taxed
to the CEO at the CEO's ordinary income tax rate.99 If the CEO had not
91 Id.
92 I.R.C. § 421(a)(1) (1964).
931 Id. § 421(a)(2).
94 I.R.C. § 422(a)(1) (2002).
95 I.R.C. § 421(b) (2002).
96 id.
97 When a disposition disqualifies an ISO, the exception to taxability does not
apply. See I.R.C. § 83(e). Since I.R.C. § 421 is inapplicable upon disqualification,
the amount of income to the employee and the deduction to the employer is the fair
market value minus the amount paid upon exercising the option. Id. § 83(a).
9' The $30 is calculated from the difference in the proceeds of the disposition,
$50, reduced by the price paid for the stock, $20.
99 It is safe to assume that a CEO of any corporation issuing ISOs will be in the
highest ordinary income tax rates. The maximum ordinary income tax rate for the
year 2001 was 39.6%. I.R.C. § l(a)(2) (2001).
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disqualified the ISO, the CEO would not have been taxed until he
subsequently sold the stock received from exercising the qualified ISO. The
difference between the proceeds received upon the subsequent disposition
and the price paid for the stock upon exercising the qualified ISO would be
taxed at the capital gain rates for individuals.'
3. Accounting Treatment for Stock Options
The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") provides two
methods of accounting for stock option plans: the fair value based method
and the intrinsic value based method.' The FASB prefers the fair value
based method.' 2 The fair value based method provides compensation cost
to be measured at the date of grant based on the value of the option and is
recognized over the vesting period. 03 The fair value of the option is
determined by taking into account the stock price at the grant date of the
option, the exercise price of the option, the expected life of the option,
volatility of the price of the underlying stock, any expected dividends paid
on the stock, and the risk-free interest rate over the expected life of the
option.' ° Essentially, the fair value based method requires companies
issuing stock options to record compensation expense based on a valuation
model on the grant date of the stock options.
The intrinsic value based method for valuing compensation cost
requires compensation expense be recorded for the excess, if any, of the
market price of the stock at grant date over the amount to be paid for the
stock upon exercising the option." 5 In almost all cases, corporations issue
stock options with an exercise price equal to the market price at the date of
grant, resulting in a corporation utilizing the intrinsic value based method
and not recording compensation expense on its respective income state-
ment.'0 6 Under the intrinsic value method, a corporation only has to
disclose the theoretical value of the stock options in the footnotes to the
10 The maximum capital gains rate for sales of stock in the year 2001 was 20%.
Id. § l(h)(1)(c). One can see that the disqualification of the ISO can have a drama-
tic impact when comparing being taxed at 20% for qualified ISOs and being taxed
at 39.6% on disqualified ISOs.
'"' ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 123 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd., 1995).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
1o6 Phyllis Plitch, Deals & Deal Makers: Global Accounting Faces Stock-Option
Tift, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2001, at C14.
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financial statements. °7 Thus, the major difference on the grant date
between the two methods is that the intrinsic value method does not require
compensation expense to be recorded when the exercise price equals the
market price, while the fair value method requires compensation expense
to be recorded.
By enacting Statement 123, the FASB was trying to force U.S.
companies to recognize the value of employee stock options as a financial
expense under the fair value method.' To combat this attempt, corpora-
tions addressed Congress and the corporations' allies within Congress
threatened the existence of the FASB if it only allowed corporations to use
the fair value method in accounting for stock options.' °9 Ultimately, the
FASB concluded that the best approach was to allow corporations to
choose which method to apply when accounting for stock options." 0 The
result, therefore, is the opportunity for corporations to choose between the
intrinsic value method and the fair value method.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE IRS'S POSITION
This Part analyzes the various theories the IRS sets forth to support the
inclusion of stock option gains in cost sharing arrangements and non-
integral service agreements. The focus of the analysis is on cost sharing
arrangements, but the theories could easily apply to non-integral service
agreements as well. The first sub-part focuses on whether stock option
gains must be billed to meet the arm's length standard. The second sub-part
discusses whether stock option gains are a true cost.
A. Inclusion of Stock Option Gains Conforms to the Arm's Length
Standard
As previously stated, transfer pricing "places a controlled taxpayer on
a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer by determining the true taxable
income of the controlled taxpayer."' " In order to determine the true taxable
income of a controlled taxpayer, the arm's length standard is applied to the
transactions among members of a controlled group." 2 A controlled
transaction meets the arm's length standard if the results are consistent with
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (1994).
I2Id. § 1.482-1(b)(1).
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the results that would have been realized had two unrelated parties entered
into the transactions.'
13
Regarding cost sharing arrangements and non-integral service
agreements, the IRS expressly asserts that inclusion of the value of stock
options is mandated for compliance with the arm's length standard." 4 The
IRS illustrates this point with the following example:
At arm's-length, a business would be unwilling to expend 100% of the
time of its researchers on a project in which the business retained only
74% of the results. The business would be willing to proceed only if the
parties receiving the 26% interest reimbursed it for 26% of the compensa-
tion value and so defrayed the real opportunity cost to the business of not
otherwise employing its R&D labor on a project in which it was entitled
to 100% of the fruits. The business would not just ignore a significant
element of the value of the researchers' compensation on the purported
rationale that the labor is "free of cost" when compensated in stock
options. That is precisely the type of distortion that Section 482 authorizes
the Service to prevent by appropriate adjustment."15
The IRS further notes that "Corporation A receive[s] 100% of the tax
deductions attributable to R&D compensated through stock options, while
reporting only 74% of the corresponding income."
'"16
The IRS makes the point that a corporate taxpayer would be unwilling
to pay 100% of the costs of a research project while only retaining a portion
of the rights to the project's results. This is because the cost sharer
normally receives rights to the property in proportion to the costs shared.' "'
The cost sharer is gaining a property right without paying the related costs
if stock option gains are not included in the cost sharing pools. The theory
put forth by the IRS asserts that a corporate taxpayer would only agree to
a cost sharing arrangement if 100% of the compensation-including stock
options-is included in the cost sharing pool of costs to be billed.
Accordingly, in order to meet the arm's length standard, stock option gains
must be billed as a shared cost under the IRS's theory.
One only has to read the federal government's own regulations to find
proof contrary to the IRS's assertion that stock option gains must be
included in order to meet the arm's length standard. Under the Federal
113Id.
114 I.R.S. FSA 200103024 (Jan. 19, 2001).
l15Id.
116id.
117 Id.
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Acquisition Regulations System, which governs all civil and military
contracts with private business, the federal government is prohibited from
reimbursing "[a]ny compensation which is calculated or valued based on
changes in the price of corporate securities." ' In other words, if a
corporation issues stock options to its employees with an exercise price
equal to the prevailing market price at the grant date, any gains upon
exercising the option would be ineligible for reimbursement under a
governmental contract because the compensation relates to the change in
price of a corporate security. The federal government is prohibited from
paying for stock option gains, but the IRS asserts that stock options must
be included in cost sharing arrangements in order to meet the arm's length
standard." 9 To illustrate the potential impact of the government's position
of not including stock option gains as costs eligible as part of the contract
price, the following example is included.
In 2000, the largest Department of Defense research and development
contractor was Lockheed Martin. 2 ' On December 31, 2000, Lockheed
Martin had approximately 27.9 million exercisable stock options outstand-
ing at an average exercise price of $31.91."' This equates to potentially
$56.9 million in gains that could have been exercised." Under the IRS's
rationale, all employees of the contractor working on contract research
projects for the government would have their gains billed as part of the
contract price, even though the government itself prohibits such an
arrangement.
Why would two unrelated parties agree to pay for stock option gains?
Logically, the party sharing the stock option gains would be susceptible to
large swings in the potential contract price if such a contingency existed in
the contract. To illustrate, assume a party negotiated with Lockheed Martin
agreeing to reimburse for stock option gains and that all Lockheed Martin
employees will work on the contracted project. The potential exposure at
the end of the year 2000 would have been $56.9 million in additional
contract costs related to stock option exercises in 2000. If the number of
"a 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-h(2)(i)(1) (1986).
'19 I.R.S. FSA 200103024 (Jan. 19, 2001).
20 LockheedMariin Ranked as Top Defense Contractorfor Sixth Straight Year,
GOv'T CONTRACTOR 56 (Feb. 7, 2001).
2 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 60 (2001).
'22 The difference in the exercise price and the closing market price on December
29, 2000 was $2.04. This difference multiplied by the outstanding exercisable stock
options of $27.9 million equates to gains of $56.9 million. Historical Prices--LMT,
athttp://table.fmance.yahoo.com/d?a= 1 &b=29&c=2000&d= 1&e=29&f-12000&g
=d&s=lmt.
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outstanding exercisable stock options on December 31, 2001 mirrors the
outstanding exercisable stock options on December 31,2000, the additional
contract price exposure would increase to $411.8 million.' In only twelve
months, the contract price exposure, due to the stock option gains, would
have a four-fold increase.
This exposure brings a level of uncertainty to the business world that
prudent corporations would be unwilling to assume. The stock option gains
portion of the contract price would be driven by the volatility of the stock
price, the number of options granted by the service providing organization,
the vesting period on the stock options, and by whether the individual
employees exercise their options during the period governed by the
agreement. These factors are driven by economics, the employee's
preferences and finances, and the issuing corporation's discretion regarding
stock option grants. The aforementioned factors have no relationship to the
research services provided to the party sharing the costs, so it is illogical to
expect a party to pay for stock option gains.
Companies do enter contingent arrangements and it is arguable that
these issues may be handled by careful contract drafting and negotiations.
Stock options are not the typical type of contingency that companies agree
to reimburse. Stock options are a perk given to employees at the discretion
of the issuing corporation, but are not a necessity to the performance of the
services. Therefore, companies unrelated to each other would not be willing
to assume a contingency that is not even required for performance of the
services. This is evident since the government, with its own regulations,
refuses to reimburse service providers for the cost of stock option gains.
This is proof that stock option gains are not shared or reimbursed in the
marketplace because the federal government is a player in the marketplace.
To further support the conclusion that unrelated parties are not willing
to contract for such a contingency, the IRS has admitted that it has been
unable to locate an actual arm's length transaction, where the parties agreed
to share the stock option gains. 24 As previously stated, the IRS is unable
123 The closing stock price for Lockheed Martin on December 31, 2001 was
$46.67. Historical Prices-LMT, at http:table.fmance.yahoo.com/d?a=ll&b=
31&c=2001&d=1 &e=3 &f=2001&g--d&s=lmt. Taking the December 31, 2000
average exercise price of $31.91 and subtracting that number from $46.67, the
average gain per each stock option is $14.76. Multiplying the $14.76 gain by the
number of outstanding shares on December 31, 2000 (27.9 million), the result is
a gain of $411.8 million. The December 31, 2000 stock option figures were the
most current available as of November 1, 2002.
124 Seagate Tech., Inc. v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 912 (2000).
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to provide proof of such a transaction because such a transaction does not
exist.
Another point the IRS uses to support its assertion that failure to bill
stock options results in failure of the arm's length standard is the fact that
a corporation receives 100% of the tax deductions related to stock options,
while not reporting income from the cost sharing of the stock options since
the stock option gains have not been billed.12 The problem with this
argument is that, by the very nature of the costs eligible for cost pool,
corporations are going to have deductions which do not have a correspond-
ing amount of income reported. This stems from the fact that depreciation
and amortization are exempt from the cost pool that is to be billed to
participating entities.'26 Therefore, it is inherent in the cost sharing
structure that a corporation will take deductions for amounts which the
corporation is not then required to include in the pool of costs to be billed.
This results in deductions for which income will not be reported from the
cost sharing.
Thus, the facts in the marketplace indicate that the IRS's basis for
inclusion of stock option gains is contraiy to reality. The best indicator is
the fact that the federal government prohibits reimbursement of stock
option gains. The second argument by the IRS is faulty since the very
language of the cost sharing regulations provides for deductions for which
income will not be reported from cost sharing.
B. Stock Option Gains Are Not a Cost for Section 482 Purposes
Stock option gains fail to qualify as costs for Section 482 purposes. A
detailed reading of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 reflects Congress's intent to rely
upon Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). Therefore,
stock option gains reported under the intrinsic method for GAAP purposes
should not be included in cost sharing pools. Secondly, the issuance of
stock options by a corporation does not result in an out-of-pocket expense
to the corporation. It follows from the aforementioned reasons that the IRS
has no solid basis for the inclusion of stock option gains in cost sharing
arrangements.
1. GAAP Standards Govern the
Treatment of Stock Options for Section 482 Purposes
The costs to be included in a cost sharing arrangement consist of all
operating expenses, except depreciation and amortization, and the cost for
125 I.R.S. FSA 200103024 (Jan. 19, 2001).
126 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(1) (amended 2001).
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the use of any tangible property. 27 The definition of operating expenses for
cost sharing purposes lists the typical GAAP operating expenses: advertis-
ing, depreciation, amortization, distribution, warehousing, promotion, sales,
and marketing. 28 By specifically listing costs considered to be operating
expenses for GAAP purposes, the Treasury was reflecting its intent that
GAAP principles govern the content of the costs to be included in cost
sharing pools.
In almost all cases, corporations adopt the intrinsic method to report
stock options on GAAP financial statements. 9 With the election of the
intrinsic method and the issuance of stock options at the prevailing market
values on the grant date,,corporations do not report a cost regarding stock
option issuances on their financial statements. Following the Treasury's
clear intention that GAAP treatment govern the costs eligible for the cost
sharing pool, the stock options would not be included, since no expense is
ever recorded as a cost to the corporation.
The IRS combats this fact by stating that a costless position "produces
a distortive mismatch of tax deductions and income."'"3 As previously
stated, the Treasury wrote this possibility into the regulations by excluding
depreciation from the cost sharing pool. The corporation deducts deprecia-
tion but does not report income since the depreciation is never billed to the
participating cost sharer. Therefore the IRS's argument is without merit.
Secondly, the IRS focuses on the fact that a-corporation may choose to
book an expense upon issuing the stock options by electing the fair value
based method. 3' The IRS's argument might have merit if its application
were limited to instances where the fair market based method is adopted.
To the contrary, the IRS makes the argument and attempts to apply it
broadly to all situations, regardless of the method chosen for reporting
stock options. As previously stated, inclusion of stock options in a cost
sharing pool under the intrinsic method is contrary to the Treasury's stated
intent that GAAP govern the costs included in a cost sharing pool.
Lastly, the IRS points out that "there is no required conformity between
the Section 482 'cost' concept and financial accounting."'3 2 To support this
argument, the IRS states that the regulations themselves recognize the
potential for differences between GAAP and tax cost sharing pools. 33 The
provision the IRS relies upon states:
127 Id.
121 Id. § 1.482-5(d)(3) (1994).
129 See ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, supra note 101.
130 I.R.S. FSA 200103024 (Jan. 19, 2001).
131 id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at n.3 5.
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The accounting method used to determine the costs and benefits of
the intangible development (including the method used to translate foreign
currencies), and, to the extent that the method materially differs from U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles, an explanation of such material
differences.1
34
The IRS is correct that the regulation recognizes the potential for differ-
ences between GAAP and the cost sharing method, but the IRS has failed
to take this statement in the proper context. By stating "the accounting
method used to determine the costs and benefits," there is a clear indication
that GAAP determines the costs to be included in the cost sharing pool of
costs.1 35 In addition, it requires an explanation for any deviations from
GAAP since GAAP costs are the costs to be included in a cost sharing pool
of costs.
The IRS uses the explanation requirement for any variances from
GAAP to try to assert that this indicates that GAAP does not govern the
cost pool. The language is clear; this interpretation takes the explanation
requirement out of context. Not only does the Treasury state that the
accounting method is used to determine the costs, the Treasury requires an
explanation for any deviations from GAAP.
It is clear from the language that GAAP drives the costs to be included
in a cost sharing pool. The fact that the Treasury requires an explanation
for any deviations from GAAP further illustrates this point.
2. Issuance of Stock Options By a
Corporation Does Not Result in an Out-of-Pocket Expense
The cost sharing regulations require that cost pools include "all" costs
incurred related to the development project. 136 The IRS asserts that stock
option gains are "costs" to the issuing corporation; therefore, gains are to
be included in the cost sharing pools.
The key words to focus on are "costs incurred." With stock options, the
issuing corporation incurs no cost upon granting the stock options. It is
merely an option to buy equity in the issuing corporation. If stock options
are in the money at the vesting date, the employee exercising the option
purchases equity in the issuing corporation. This purchase does not cost the
corporation. The only effect the transaction has in relation to the corpora-
134 Treas. Reg. 1.482-7(j)(2)(D) (amended 2001).
135 Id. (emphasis added).
13 6 Id. § 1.482-7(d)(1).
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tion is to dilute the existing shareholders' value. The value of the corpora-
tion remains the same, but the percentage ownership of existing sharehold-
ers decreases, resulting in a decrease in the value held by them. Market
pressures deal with this outcome by adjusting the stock price.
In reviewing the definition of "operating expenses," it is obvious that
the regulations are geared toward including expenses involving cash
outlays in the cost sharing pools. All operating expenses are included
except depreciation and amortization.' Depreciation is the recovery
through deductions of the purchase price of a capital asset over the useful
life of the said asset, but does not involve a cash outlay each year a
deduction is taken. Operating expenses that are included in a cost sharing
pool are expenses that are generated by a cash outlay during the year by the
incurring corporation. A stock option is more similar to depreciation since
the option typically does not vest for at least five years from the year the
tax deduction is taken, and no cash is paid by the issuing corporation.
Therefore, the treatment of stock option gains should be excluded due to
the close similarity to depreciation and the clear intent that costs included
in cost sharing pools be out-of-pocket expenses.
[I. PROPOSED REGULATIONS REQUIRING
STOCK OPTION INCLUSION IN COST SHARING PAYMENTS
On July 29, 2002, the IRS issued proposed regulations.3 requiring the
inclusion of stock options in cost sharing arrangements. The proposed
regulations sought to "clarify that stock-based compensation is taken into
account in determining the operating expenses treated as a controlled
participant's intangible development costs for purposes of the cost sharing
provisions... "19 As previously pointed out, while the IRS has attempted
to be creative by changing the law to achieve a desired result, this position
does not stand up to scrutiny or reality. 4 °
A. Coordination of Cost Sharing and the Arm's Length Standard
The proposed regulations state that cost sharing arrangements meet the
arm's length standard if and only if stock options are included in the
137 Id.
138 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,997 (July 29, 2002).
139 Id.
'40 See supra notes 111-34 and accompanying text.
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operating expenses of the cost sharing arrangement.' 4 ' This is in conflict
with the established goal of the arm's length standard, which is to achieve
the same result from related party transactions as would have been achieved
had two unrelated parties entered the same transaction. 42 In the proposed
regulations, the IRS legislated the definition of the arm's length standard
by requiring the inclusion of stock options in cost sharing arrangements. If
the IRS is allowed to finalize the proposed regulations without change, a
signal will be sent to the IRS that the easiest way around any shortcomings
in its positions is legislating to achieve the desired outcome.
Congress has made it blatantly clear that the arm's length standard
applies when transfers are made to related parties. Congress has stated
"[tlransfers to related foreign corporations... are subject to an 'arm 's-
length standard.""43 Congress further indicated that it did not intend to
legislate what constitutes an arm's length standard by stating "[u]ncertainty
exists regarding what transfers are appropriate to treat as 'arm 's-length'
comparables... ." " The fact that Congress acknowledged uncertainty in
identifying comparables for the arm's length standard is an indicator that
Congress had no intention of legislating what constitutes an arm's length
standard when transferring intangibles. Since Congress is the only body
empowered to legislate such an issue, the IRS has clearly overstepped the
bounds of its power by drafting proposed regulations legislating the
definition of the arm's length standard for cost sharing arrangements.
Even if the IRS did have the power to legislate such an issue, the
position runs counter to the true concept of the arm's length standard. The
arm's length standard aims to ensure that the results of transactions
between related parties are consistent with the results between unrelated
parties conducting the same transaction under similar circumstances. 4" By
legislating the definition of an arm's length standard in the context of cost
sharing arrangements, the IRS is replacing the true arm's length standard
established by the marketplace with a definition that provides the IRS an
avenue to overcome the argument that inclusion of stock options violates
the concept of arm's length. The marketplace does not take stock options
141 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(a)(3), (d)(2), 67 Fed. Reg. 48,997 (July 29,
2002) (Section 1.482-7(a)(3) references § 1.482-7(d)(2), which requires a partici-
pant to include all costs including "stock-based compensation").
142 See supra notes 18-42 and accompanying text.
43 Reform Act, 140 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-841 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4725 (emphasis added).
'" Id. (emphasis added).
141 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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into account when negotiating service contracts or cost sharing arrange-
ments-as evidenced by the U.S. government's own position to disallow
the inclusion of stock options in the price of governmental contracts.146 The
IRS should acknowledge the reality of the marketplace and cease to attempt
legislating around the shortcomings of its position of stock option inclusion
in cost sharing arrangements.
B. Stock-Based Compensation
The newly issued proposed regulations provide that "in determining a
controlled participant's operating expenses.., all compensation, including
stock-based compensation, must be taken into account." 147 Stock-based
compensation includes "such forms of compensation as restricted stock,
nonstatutory stock options, statutory stock options... stock appreciation
rights, and phantom stock."'' 41 The proposed regulations further state that
statutory stock options are included as stock-based compensation regardless
of whether the employer can take an income tax deduction with respect to
the options.
49
The IRS's inclusion of statutory stock options as stock-based compen-
sation is an interesting position. The IRS claims that this is an operating
expense includable in the cost sharing pool, but there is no cost to the
company issuing the statutory stock option, and the company in most
instances does not even receive a tax deduction. 5 ' Therefore, not only is it
possible that the ISOs will not be reflected on the income statement,
5
1
chances are that the issuing company will not even get a tax deduction for
the ISOs.51 However, the IRS counter intuitively believes the perceived
costs associated with the ISOs should be included in cost sharing arrange-
ments. The weakness of the position taken by the IRS is reflected by the
fact that the IRS is proposing the inclusion in cost sharing arrangements of
a value for stock options that will not be reflected in an income statement
or deducted on a tax return.
'4See supra notes 105-26 and accompanying text.
11 Prop. Treas, Reg. § 1.482-7, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,997 (July 26, 2002).
148Id.
149 Id. See supra notes 80- 100 and accompanying text (discussing ISOs and the
deductibility of ISOs for the employer).
'
50 See supra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
'1' See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
52 See supra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
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C. Inclusion at Cost Sharing Termination
Another interesting proposal by the IRS is the requirement that any
vested stock options where the underlying stock has a fair market value in
excess of the exercise price at the time the cost sharing arrangement
terminates be includable in cost sharing arrangements.5 3 The IRS claims
"the rule ensures that controlled participants take into 'account for cost
sharing purposes all stock-based compensation that is attributable to the
development of intangibles and has become exercisable during the term of
the cost sharing arrangement."' 4
This rule sets up the scenario whereby an issuer includes stock options
upon termination of the cost sharing arrangement, the underlying stock
drops below the exercise price after the cost sharing termination, and the
stock options are never exercised because the options are out-of-the-money.
Under this scenario, the participating party has paid for stock options that
are never exercised due to the drop in the price of stock. With this scenario,
there is obviously no cost involved because the stock options lapse without
being exercised. Even if one believes there are costs involved with stock
options, when-the options lapse without being exercised one is hard-pressed
to argue that a cost exists. The issuer provided the employee with a piece
of paper that for all practical and economic purposes was just a piece of
paper.
The proposed regulations state that the "Treasury and the IRS believe
that due regard must be given to the emphasis placed on economic factors
in the legislative history of the commensurate with income standard
.... ""I In addition, the proposed regulations make the point that "cost
sharing arrangements must 'reflect the actual economic activity' of partici-
pants."' 56 Applying the IRS's language to the aforementioned scenario
where the stock options labse, it is clear that the "economic activity of the
participants," especially the issuer, is only the issuance of a piece of paper.
How can one now be expected to pay large amounts of money for the
issuance of a worthless piece of paper? The outcome in this situation when
applying the proposed regulations does not make sense in the business
world.
CONCLUSION
The basis for the theory that stock option gains must be included in cost
sharing pools does not stand up to the language of the final regulations, nor
5 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,997, 48,999 (July 29, 2002).
'5 4 Id. at 49,000.
'Id. at 48,999.
156 Id.
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does it follow what unrelated parties do in the marketplace. The IRS argues
that in order to meet the arm's length standard, stock options must be
included in cost sharing pools and that stock option gains are a cost to
corporations to be billed to cost sharers. The IRS is attempting to legislate
this position by issuing proposed regulations requiring stock option
inclusion for compliance with the arm's length standard.
First, it is obvious that unrelated parties do not share stock option
gains. This is evident from the federal government's own regulations
barring any reimbursements for stock option gains on services provided by
private parties to the government. While the IRS is aware of this prohibi-
tion, it continues to argue that unrelated parties would bill stock option
gains. The IRS makes the assertion but, as it has admitted, is unable to
provide any transactions indicating that this is reality in the marketplace.
Second, the argument that stock options are a cost to the corporation is
unfounded. The stock options are merely perks to an employee that allow
the employee to purchase an equity share of the issuing corporation.
Furthermore, the regulations are clear that GAAP drives what is included
in a cost sharing pool. The IRS tries to negate the intent of the regulations
by latching onto a phrase, taking it out of context, and arguing that the
regulations acknowledge the potential for GAAP and tax differences. The
IRS is correct that the regulations acknowledge such a potential, but the
regulations require an explanation for such variations since they are a
deviation from the intended method (GAAP) to be used for determining the
cost sharing pool.
With the issuance of the proposed regulations, the IRS is overstepping
its empowerment by going against the stated intentions of Congress. The
proposed regulations are an attempt to legislate around shortcomings in the
IRS's position. The IRS's position is apparently not well reasoned. As
written, there are many scenarios that will not make sense when applying
the proposed regulations.
To argue its overall position, the IRS makes unsupported assertions
regarding the marketplace, takes the language of the regulations out of
context, and now has proposed regulations to reach its desired outcome. In
summary, the arguments put forth by the IRS for inclusion of stock option
gains in cost sharing arrangements and non-integral service agreements,
"wither[ ] in the light of objectivity to a heap of conclusory straws."'15 7
Therefore, the courts should dispel the IRS's arguments and rule that stock
option gains are not to be included in cost sharing arrangements and non-
integral service agreements. In addition, the IRS should withdraw the
117 Concord Auto Auction, Inc. v. Rustin, 627 F. Supp. 1526, 1531 (D. Mass.
1986).
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proposed regulations and face the reality that arm's length does not entail
the inclusion of stock options in cost sharing arrangements.

